Mr. Weaver’s comments are his own and do not reflect the opinions or policies of Strategic Resilience Group or the Information Professionals Association.

The U.S. Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) structure, while historically effective, is increasingly challenged by the complexities of the current national security environment and evolutionary modifications to priorities of the U.S. National Defense Strategy.

The rise of non-state actors, trans-national criminal organizations, global competitors, and the interconnectedness of modern irregular warfare across multiple domains strain a model primarily designed for regional conflicts. While the GCCs still provide critical regional expertise, the limitations of their boundaries, the competition for resources, and the cumbersome nature of coordinating trans-regional threats are persistent shortcomings that demand reform.

Initial guidance for the development of the 2025 National Defense Strategy prioritized defense of the U.S. homeland and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. It also emphasized an increase in burden sharing with our allies and partners in the process of strengthening those relationships. More recent reporting implies that a current draft of this strategy is placing greater priorities on domestic and regional problem sets rather than directly countering our Chinese or Russian adversaries. This seems to be an evolutionary change of focus from the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies that may justify a change in command structures.

Inadequacy in Addressing Trans-Regional and Functional Threats

A primary criticism of the GCC structure is its rigid regional focus in a security environment where threats are no longer contained within neat geo-political boundaries. The current structure is ill-equipped to address threats that span multiple regions, such as:

• Near-peer competition: A major conflict with a great power like China would require a globally integrated response, which is difficult under a system that silos operational authorities by geographic combatant command. The siloed approach prevents the cohesive, global planning needed for modern coalition joint-all domain campaigns empowered by the inter-agency.

• Global terrorism: The military must rely on Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a functional combatant command, to lead counterterrorism campaigns because the threat does not respect GCC boundaries.

• Trans-national crime: The convergence of near-peer competition with global terrorism and private military companies has created multidimensional networks of profit and politically motivated adversaries that operate within the framework of international law and exploit U.S. law, policies, and programs.

• Cyber and space warfare: These threats do not originate or occur within defined areas of responsibility (AORs). Functional commands like U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) exist to manage these domains, but their operational relationship with the GCCs can be complex. A recent example is the creation of a new functional Space Command in 2018 to address vulnerabilities in the domain, a perceived necessity driven by the cross-functional and multi-domain nature of the threat.

Coordination and Unity of Command Issues

While the GCCs are designed to facilitate jointness within their AORs, the broader structure faces challenges related to coordination and unity of command when threats extend beyond one region.

• The Arctic region, for instance, spans the AORs of three different GCCs (NORTHCOM, EUCOM, and INDOPACOM), making coordinated strategy and advocacy difficult.

• The Joint Staff lacks any authority to direct the action of Geographic or Functional Combatant Commands. In a crisis, the loss of time and context due to the slow and cumbersome process of integration, coordination, and synchronization across boundaries could result in adversary exploitation along multiple operational seams.

• The reliance on subordinate commands and joint task forces to execute specific missions can sometimes create redundancies and reduce operational effectiveness. The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), which predates AFRICOM, is an example of a persistent mission requirement that operates as a subordinate command.

• Current Joint Staff global assessment processes are dependent on intelligence, data, and feedback from Combatant Commands to inform national command authority decision making. GCCs that are assigned primary responsibility for specific trans-regional problem sets but lack the authority and resources to engage and collect unilaterally outside of their AORs—USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM provide perfect examples—face constraints exploited by the PRC and Russia to gain access to Africa, South America, and the Middle East.

The Challenge of Limited Resources and Inefficient Overhead

The GCC structure is a pot-bellied system with high operating costs that result in inefficiencies.

• Each GCC is a separate four-star command with a large headquarters staff, generating significant administrative expenses in terms of personnel, communications, and time. With a smaller military force structure than previous eras, the current high operational tempo demanded by the GCC staffs is taxing the force. The competition for national resources across different commands also complicates operational planning and distracts from strategic planning efforts by the Joint Staff.

• A merger of regional commands could lead to more efficient planning and operations. Some experts have suggested consolidating the number of GCCs or shifting to a more global approach, which could reduce overhead and optimize resource allocation. This merger would provide the resources and expertise to reestablish the Joint Forces Command and reinforce the Joint Staff to serve as the Global Force Integrator on behalf of the National Command Authority.

Adapting and Implementing Structural Reform

The GCC structure has shown some ability to change and adapt. The National Command Authority (NCA) has demonstrated the ability to realign Combatant Command Headquarters, as seen with transitions involving USJFCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USCYBERCOM. Congress has also supported the establishment of new commands like AFRICOM (2007) and the re-establishment of USSPACECOM (2018). The Unified Command Plan (UCP), which outlines the GCCs' responsibilities, is periodically updated to reflect changes in the strategic environment. However, these changes are often incremental, and bureaucratic inertia can slow more substantial reform.

Several alternatives or reforms have been proposed to address these shortcomings, including:

• Consolidation: Reducing the number of GCCs to improve efficiency and allow commanders to manage competition across a wider area.

• Shift to a global approach: Eliminating the regional command structure in favor of a globally integrated model focused on multi-domain campaigns against strategically significant problem sets.

• Differentiating functional and operational command roles: The continued focus on capability-based commands increases competition for operational resources and administrative burdens outside of command channels. Execution authorities for national resources often require Geographic CCMD approval after interagency coordination, making integration more difficult.

• Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces (CJIATFs): Under a Global Force Integrator rather than a CCMD, these could offer problem-specific (rather than geographically focused) solutions to trans-regional threats. CCMDs could employ assigned and aligned units in support of Military Groups and Embassies associated with CJIATFs, fostering transregional security with partner nations sharing common threats.

Conclusion

The geographic combatant command structure, though a product of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and historically effective, faces increasing pressure from a shifting national security landscape. The rise of non-state and non-traditional adversaries, the global reach of trans-regional competitors and criminal organizations, and the increased dependence on multi-domain operations challenge the efficacy of a rigid, regionally focused command model. Criticisms related to trans-regional threat coordination, inefficient overhead, and inter-command competition underscore the need for reform. While incremental adjustments have occurred, the question remains whether the current structure can be sufficiently adapted or if a more fundamental restructuring is needed to meet the demands of the 21st-century security environment.

W. Scott Weaver, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army (Retired), applies 37 years of experience in the planning, preparation, and conduct of conventional and irregular informational activities in pursuit of individual contributor readiness, professional development, and national security objectives. Special thanks to Strategic Resilience Group and the Information Professionals Association’s Virtual Writing Lab for inspiring this effort. Any comments and opinions are those of the author.

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