In May 2025, the U.S. State Department renewed an offer of up to $10 million for  information to disrupt Hezbollah financing in the Tri-Border Area. Weeks later,  Paraguay confirmed plans for a counter-terror center with U.S./FBI support to  monitor Hezbollah-linked activity affecting the frontier. These moves are the clearest  current signals that foreign presence in the TBA is being addressed now—and that  the priority is finance and facilitation.  Also this summer, FinCEN detailed how Chinese Money Laundering Networks (CMLNs) move proceeds for Western-Hemisphere cartels via trade, underground  banking, and third-party payments—about $312 billion in SAR-flagged activity  (2020–2024). And the U.S. Department of Justice charged a Venezuela sanctionsevasion scheme that routed payments and goods through fronts in third countries.  Both developments describe tools that foreign-linked networks can rent or face in the  TBA.  Against that backdrop, the local enforcement baseline is visible. On August 31, 2025,  Brazil’s Polícia Federal led a pre-dawn sweep in southern Foz do Iguaçu resulting in  two arrests and 21 vehicles retained; warrant checks). On July 1, Paraná’s GAECO with the PF detained a suspected Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) operative and  moved to block about R$18 million in bank funds, real estate (Foz do Iguaçu,  Cascavel, Santa Catarina coast), and vehicles. On June 13, Paraguay’s police  intelligence warned of a possible PCC action and reinforced patrols across Ciudad  del Este and northern districts. These events mark the operational space in which  foreign-linked finance and logistics operate.